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THE ESSENCE TEST: PICKING UP A SUPREME
COURT FUMBLE
Thomas Gentry
Labor arbitration continues to be “the primary method utilized by public and
private employers and unions to solve disputes that arise in the workplace under
labor agreements,”1 even though it has been nearly sixty years since the United
States Supreme Court first enunciated its guiding principles and the grounds for
vacatur of labor arbitration. 2 Viewed in the context of the Labor Management
Relations Act3 (LMRA), this reality becomes especially problematic. The
LMRA contains no specific grounds for vacatur of arbitration awards, 4 and is
therefore dependent upon the Supreme Court to have any teeth. This has been
an area, however, where the Supreme Court has fumbled repeatedly. The
Supreme Court’s missteps are most apparent under the “essence test,” 5 a
judicially created remedy that losing parties to an arbitration dispute often plead
in the hopes that a reviewing court will vacate the arbitration award. 6
The essence test is a common law mechanism created by the Supreme Court
in the Steelworker Trilogy7 cases to enable a judge to vacate an arbitration award
that fails to “draw[] its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.”8
Multiple circuits have attempted to articulate when an arbitration award fails to
draw its essence from the agreement, without a single interpretation appearing



J.D., T he Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2018; B.A., T he Catholic
University of America, 2015. I would like to thank Professor Frederick Woods for his expertise
and guidance throughout the formulation of this paper. I would also like to thank Professor
Megan La Belle and the staff and editors of the Catholic University Law Review for their review
of this paper. All errors are my own.
1. A Practical Guide to Grievance Arbitration, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION at 1,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/basics_papers/nlra/grievance_arbi
tration.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
2. See infra Section III.A (discussing the Steelworker Trilogy cases decided in 1960).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2012).
4. Infra Section II.A.
5. See infra Section III.B.
6. See Jonathan R. Waldron, Vacatur of Labor Arbitration Awards: Watering Down the
Supreme Court’s “Drawn from the Essence” Precedent May Sound the Death Knell for Labor
Arbitration, 2005 J. DISP . RESOL . 539, 544 (discussing losing parties’ use of the essence test and
various courts’ willingness to reach the underlying merits of the case when reviewing a labor
arbitration award).
7. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
8. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597.
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to lead the way. 9 Circuits have stated that an award fails to draw its essence
from the agreement when it is “unfounded in reason and fact,”10 when the award
is “completely irrational,”11 or when the arbitrator is not “arguably construing
or applying the contract.”12 But these attempts to make the essence test a usable
standard have proven to be unsuccessful. 13
In practice, courts have used one of these various interpretations of the essence
test to necessarily review the merits of arbitration awards. 14 But under the
guiding principles of the Steelworker Trilogy cases, courts are forbidden to
review the merits of arbitration awards. 15 The issue facing the courts directly
relates to the incompatibility of these two judicial principles: allowing vacaturs
that do not draw their essence from the agreement, yet simultaneously
demanding a court refrain from reviewing the merits of that arbitration award.
This Comment will discuss the paradox of these two judicial mandates within
the context of the Adrian Peterson arbitration appeal through the district court 16
and appellate court. 17 This Comment will examine the development of the
essence test in the United States Supreme Court and various circuit courts, as
well as the Supreme Court’s preference against review of the merits of
arbitration awards. Then, this Comment will demonstrate that the essence test
and the Supreme Court’s prohibition of merit review of arbitration awards are
conflicting ideas, which require a limited exception to become compatible. This
Comment concludes by providing a solution to this conflict: through a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA), parties could contractually agree to expand the
scope of judicial review to include errors of law or fact, thereby enabling courts
to determine that an arbitration award fails to draw its essence from the
agreement if an arbitrator commits an error of law or fact. Alternatively, this

9. See Waldron, supra note 6 at 546–49 (describing different approaches taken to
determining whether an arbitration award derives its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement).
10. Cytyc Corp. v. Deka Prods., Ltd. P ’ship, 439 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2006).
11. Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Comedy Club, Inc. v.
Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1227, 1288 (9th Cir. 2009)).
12. Memphis Dist. of Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. T eamsters Local Union No. 984, No.
90-5933, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24760, at *11 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 1991) (quoting United
Paperworkers Int ’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)).
13. See infra Section III.C.
14. See infra Section III.C; see also Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & Convention Ctr.
v. Union De T ronquistas Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 1985) (“ T his court may engage in a
substantive review of the award only to determine whether the award is unfounded in reason and
fact . . . . In such cases, the award fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement
and must be overturned.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
15. See infra Part IV (noting that public policy favors the finality of arbitration and, therefore,
a judicial rule forbidding courts to review the merit s of arbitration awards).
16. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d
and remanded NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2016).
17. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 831 F.3d at 985.
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result could be accomplished through legislation: amending the LMRA to
provide for explicit grounds for vacatur.
Part I describes the background facts of the Peterson case and the role of the
essence test throughout that case. Part II discusses the LMRA, its impact upon
suits to vacate arbitration awards, and a shift in judicial opinion toward favoring
labor arbitration. Part III reviews the Steelworker Trilogy cases and describes
the essence test in detail, including the conflicting interpretations by the circuit
courts. Part IV suggests that collective bargaining could cure problems
surrounding the essence test. Part V proposes that, in the alternative, Congress
could negate the need for the essence test by enacting specific grounds for
vacatur similar to the Federal Arbitration Act. Finally, Part VI demonstrates that
the growing popularity of labor arbitration requires a resolution of the essence
test and the merit review paradox.
I.

T HE ADRIAN PET ERSON CASE

AS AN EXAMPLE OF T HE ESSENCE

T EST

Adrian Peterson grabbed a “switch” and “struck [his] child repeatedly.”19
The Minnesota Vikings’ star running back, and one of the National Football
League’s most accomplished players, 20 was charged with “reckless or negligent
injury to a child” in 2014. 21 This incident involving Peterson’s four-year-old
son became front-page news. 22 As the story became widely reported, Peterson
faced disciplinary action from NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell. 23
18

18. A “ switch,” as it is used in the context of the Peterson case, is a small tree branch
traditionally used in disciplining a child. Ryan Wilson, Adrian Peterson Indicted in Child Injury
Case in Texas, CBS SP ORTS (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/adrian-petersonindicted-in-child-injury-case-in-texas/.
19. Id.
20. Adrian Peterson was the seventh pick overall in the 2007 NFL draft. He is a seven time
Pro Bowl Player, four time First -team All-Pro player, three time Second-T eam All-Pro player, 2012
NFL Most Valuable Player, 2012 NFL Offensive Player of the Year, 2012 NFL Comeback Player
of the Year, two time Bert Bell Award Winner, 2007 NFL Offensive Rookie of the Year, threetime NFL rushing yards leader, two-time NFL rushing touchdowns leader, and holds the NFL
record for most rushing yards in a single game. Adrian Peterson, P RO FOOTBALL REFERENCE
https://www.pro-football-reference.com/players/P/PeteAd01.htm (last visited April 6, 2018).
21. Wilson, supra note 16. Peterson’s reckless assault case was heard in Montgomery
County, T exas in front of District Judge Kelly Case. Peterson Enters No Contest Plea, ESPN (Nov.
5, 2014), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/11819670/adrian -peterson-minnesota-vikings-enterplea-lesser-charge-felony-child-abuse-charge-avoid-jail.
22. See Wilson, supra note 18; Ben Estes, Vikings RB Adrian Peterson Pleads No Contest to
Misdemeanor in Child Abuse Case, SP ORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://www.si.com/nfl/2014/11/04/adrian-peterson-minnesota-vikings-trial-plea. Peterson’s son’s
doctor initially reported that “ the boy had a number of lacerations on his thighs, along with bruiselike marks on his lower back and buttocks and cuts on his hand.” Wilson, supra note 18.
Apparently, Peterson’s son pushed his sibling off of a motorbike video game, at which time
Peterson grabbed a thin tree branch referred to as a “ switch” and “ discipline[d]” the boy. Id.
23. See Conor Orr, Adrian Peterson Suspended Without Pay For Rest of ‘14, AROUND THE
NFL (Nov. 18, 2014, 8:54 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000430302/article/adrian
-peterson-suspended-without-pay-for-rest-of-14.
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The NFL is not new to player discipline and subsequent labor arbitration. 24
Just prior to the Peterson incident, the NFL completed its handling of the highly
publicized disciplinary proceeding involving former Baltimore Ravens’ running
back Ray Rice, after a video surfaced of Rice knocking his then-girlfriend
unconscious in an elevator. 25 Like Ray Rice, Adrian Peterson’s disciplinary
action for “conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the
game of professional football” would go to arbitration, pursuant to the NFL’s
Collective Bargaining Agreement. 26
After playing only one game in the 2014 season, Peterson was placed on the
Commissioner’s Exempt List. 27 While on the Exempt List, the NFL issued a
24. Over the last few years, there have been several recent high -profile arbitration cases
arising from NFL player discipline. For example, after the 2015 AFC Championship Game, which
became known as “ Deflate Gate,” New England Patriots quarterback T om Brady received a fourgame suspension for deflating footballs. The Case for Tom Brady: An Arbitrator’s Take, THE
W ASHINGTON P OST (June
10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early lead/wp/2016/06/10/the-case-for-tom-brady-an-arbitrators-take/?utm_term=.33ed9c363c53.
Similarly, after a 2014 domestic violence incident, former Carolina Panthers Defensive End Gregg
Hardy was suspended for 10 games, subsequently reduced in arbitration to four games. Dan
Hanzus, Greg Hardy Suspension Reduced to Four Games, AROUND THE NFL (July 10, 2015, 2:28
PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000500985/article/greg-hardy-suspension-reducedto-four-games.
25. See generally Louis Bien, A Complete Timeline of the Ray Rice Assault Case, SB NATION
(Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2014/5/23/5744964/ray -rice-arrest-assaultstatement-apology-ravens. On February 15, 2014, Ray Rice was arrested in Atlantic City, New
Jersey for simple assault after he got into a fight with his then-fiancée Janay Palmer. Id. Roger
Goodell suspended Rice for two games on July 24, 2015. Id. On September 8, 2015 T MZ released
a surveillance video of the assault incident between Rice and Palmer, which showed Rice strike
Palmer in the face, knocking her unconscious. Id. Upon seeing the video footage and after
receiving heavy criticism from the public, Goodell amended Rice’s suspension from two games to
an indefinite suspension. Id.
26. NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article 46 §1(a) at 204 (“ All disputes involving
a fine or suspension imposed upon a player for conduct on the playing field (other than as described
in Subsection (b) below) or involving action taken against a player by the Commissioner for
conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football,
will be processed exclusively as follows: the Commissioner will promptly send written notice of
his action to the player, with a copy to the NFLPA. Within three (3) business days following such
written notification, the player affected thereby, or the NFLPA with the player ’s approval, may
appeal in writing to the Commissioner.”).
27. After news of these charges came out, the Vikings placed Peterson on the
“ Commissioner’s Exempt List,” which barred Peterson from all team activities, much like a
suspension. Louis Bien, What is the NFL Exempt/Commissioner’s Permission List, and What Does
it Mean for Adrian Peterson?, SB NATION (Sept. 17, 2014, 11:37 AM),
http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2014/9/17/6333759/nfl-exempt-commissioners-permission-listexplanation-adrian-peterson-greg-hardy. T o be placed on the Commissioner’s Exempt List, both
the player and Commissioner Roger Goodell must agree. Id. At the time of the incident, the NFL
player Personnel Policy Manual described the list as follows:
T he Exempt List is a special player status available to clubs only in unusual
circumstances. T he List includes those players who have been declared by
the Commissioner to be temporarily exempt from counting within the Active
List limit. Only the Commissioner has the authority to place a player on the
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new personal conduct policy that required a minimum six game suspension for
first time violations involving domestic or child abuse. 28
With six weeks remaining in the season, Peterson was taken off the
Commissioner’s Exempt List and suspended for the remainder of the season, 29
forfeiting $4.2 million in salary. 30 This suspension was made pursuant to the
NFL’s newly implemented personal conduct policy, even though the policy was
created after the Peterson incident occurred. 31 Peterson appealed the
disciplinary decision to arbitration, and the arbitrator upheld the decision. 32 A

Exempt List; clubs have no such authority, and no exemption, regardless of
circumstances, is automatic. T he Commissioner also has the authority to
determine in advance whether a player’s time on the Exempt List will be finite
or will continue until the Commissioner deems the exemptio n should be lifted
and the player returned to the Active List.
Id. (citing NFL Player Personnel Policy Manual).
28. Katie Sharp, NFL Announces New Domestic Violence Policy, SB NATION (Aug. 28, 2014,
4:06
PM),
http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2014/8/28/6079465/n fl-announces-new-domesticviolence-policy.
29. See Roger Goodell Defends Ray Rice Ban , ESPN (Aug. 2, 2014),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/11296028/roger-goodell-defends-suspension-ray-ricebaltimore-ravens-running-back. T here was speculation that the severity of Peterson’s punishment
was largely fueled by the recent public criticism regarding the NFL’s handling of the Ray Rice
incident. See id. (“ Goodell also fielded multiple questions about the widespread public reaction to
the length of Rice’s suspension, which has been criticized as lenient compared with other NFL
suspensions for substance abuse and off-field incidents.”); see also Steve Almasy & Ashley Fantz,
NFL Chief Roger Goodell Faces Intense Criticism After Ray Rice Video , CNN (Sept. 16, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/09/us/nfl-ray-rice-criticism/ (“ Outspoken ESPN personality Keith
Olbermann called Goodell an ‘enabler of men who beat women’ and demanded the commissioner
resign or be fired.”).
30. Orr, supra note 23. After playing in the season opener, Peterson was placed on the
“ Commissioner’s Exempt List ” while awaiting discipline from the NFL. Id. While on this list,
Peterson was able to collect a salary, but could have no participation in any team activities. After
spending some time on the Commissioner’s Exempt List, Goodell ultimately decided to remove
Peterson from the List and suspended him for the remainder of the season, approximately six games.
Id.
31. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985, 985 (8th Cir. 2016) (“ T here is
no dispute that the Commissioner imposed Peterson ’s discipline under the New Policy.”); rev’d
and remanded, NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (D. Minn. 2015).
32. Peterson’s disciplinary appeal was heard by arbitrator Harold Henderson, who served as
an Executive for the NFL from 1991 through 2012. Mr. Henderson served as the NFL ’s Executive
Vice President for Labor Relations for a span of sixteen years, and as Chairman of the NFL
Management Council Executive Committee. He also served as the NFL’s Executive Vice President
for Player Development. Redacted Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award, National Football League
Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. National Football League, No. 0:14 -cv-04990-DSD-JSM, 2014
WL 7145640, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2014). In addition, Mr. Henderson served as arbitrator over
the Cowboys’ defensive end Greg Hardy’s appeal in 2015. Mark Maske, NFL Appoints Harold
Henderson to Resolve Greg Hardy’s Appeal, T HE W ASHINGTON P OST (May 7, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2015/05/07/nfl-appoints-harold-henderson-toresolve-greg-hardys-appeal/?utm_term=.74f73f42b6c0.
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second appeal was filed with the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota, where Judge David Doty overturned the arbitration award. 33
Judge Doty overturned the arbitrator’s decision to uphold Goodell’s award,
claiming that the award “fail[ed] to draw its essence from the [collective
bargaining agreement],” because arbitrator Henderson ignored the “law of the
shop” when he retroactively applied the new personal conduct policy to
Peterson. 34 Judge Doty found that the Rice decision unequivocally established
that the Commissioner cannot retroactively enforce the new personal conduct
policy against Peterson’s conduct before the creation of that policy. 35 According
to Judge Doty, the Rice decision became the “law of the shop,” and the
Commissioner ignored the law of the shop; therefore, the suspension did not
draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. 36 Contrary to the
Peterson arbitrator, Judge Doty found that the Peterson case was
indistinguishable from the Rice case. 37
Despite Judge Doty’s decision, the Eighth Circuit overruled the District Court
and reinstated the arbitration award—finding that Judge Doty incorrectly
applied the essence test—and reiterated that judges are forbidden to review the
merits of an arbitration award. 38 Judge Colloton of the Eighth Circuit stated,
“The dispositive question is whether the arbitrator was at least arguably
construing or applying the contract, including the law of shop. The arbitrator
here undoubtedly construed the Rice decision in reaching his decision.”39
Judge Colloton reiterated the guiding principles from the Steelworker Trilogy
cases, including the deference that judges should give to arbitration, stating “[i]n
an arbitration case like this one, the role of the courts is very limited,” and
“[c]ourts are not permitted to review the merits of an arbitration decision even
when a party claims that the decision rests on factual errors.” 40 Furthermore, the
Judge stated that “[a]n erroneous interpretation of a contract, including the law
of the shop, is not a sufficient basis for disregarding the conclusion of the
decisionmaker chosen by the parties.”41 Judge Colloton found that the District

33. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1091.
34. Id. “ Retroactive application” in this situation means applying the New Personal Conduct
Policy to conduct done before the Policy was created. See generally id.
35. Id. at 1090 (“ It is also undisputed that in the Rice arbitration, [Judge Jones] unequivocally
recognized that the New Policy cannot be applied retroactively.”).
36. Id. at 1091 (“ Henderson simply disregarded the law of the shop and in doing so failed to
meet his duty under the CBA. As a result, the arbitration award fails to draw its essence from the
CBA and vacatur is warranted.”).
37. Id.
38. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985, 989 (8th Cir. 2016).
39. Id. at 994.
40. Id. at 993, 995.
41. Id. at 994.
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Court could not vacate the arbitration award because it disagreed with the
arbitrator that the Rice and Peterson cases were distinguishable. 42
The Peterson case is just another example in a long line of cases that differ on
the application of the essence test and the courts’ unsanctioned attempts to use
that test to review the merits of an arbitration award. 43 To fully understand the
paradox that these judicial mandates present, it is necessary to review the
development of the LMRA and the development of the Supreme Court’s attitude
towards arbitration disputes brought under the LMRA.
II. T HE COURT ’S T RANSIT ION T O A PREFERENCE FOR ARBIT RAT ION AND T HE
DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC GROUNDS FOR VACAT UR OF LABOR ARBIT RAT ION
AWARDS
A.

The Labor Management Relations Act and Federal Arbitration Act as
Applied to Labor Disputes

The traditional view is that labor disputes, meaning disputes involving labor
unions 44 and management over collective bargaining agreements, are primarily
governed by the LMRA. 45 Accordingly, many courts have held that such labor
disputes were not within the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act 46 (FAA). 47 The
FAA governs most “contracts of employment”48 that contain pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate claims arising out of one’s employment. The Supreme
Court, however, distinguished contracts of employment from collective
bargaining agreements. 49 Nevertheless, the FAA continues to be a factor in labor
42. Id. Judge Colloton acknowledged that, during arbitration, the arbitrator addressed Rice
“ head-on” and “ explained that Rice involved second discipline imposed on a player for conduct
that was already subject to a suspension and fine, whereas Peterson ’s sanction was the first
discipline imposed.” Id. (emphasis in original).
43. See infra Section III.C.
44. T he National Football League Players Association, which brings claims on behalf of
players, is a labor union. See NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson, 831 F.3d at 989.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 185.
46. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
47. Jay E. Grenig, et al., “It’s not Over ‘Til It’s Over”: After the Arbitration Award in Sports
Arbitration, 70 DISP . RESOL . J. 21, 26 (2015); see, e.g., United Paperworkers Int ’l Union, AFLCIO, et al. v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987) (“The [Federal] Arbitration Act does not apply
to ‘contracts of employment of . . . workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce ’”); CocaCola Bottling Co. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Local 812, 242 F.3d 52, 53 (2d Cir.
2001) (“ We hold that in cases brought under . . . the Labor Management Relations Act . . . the FAA
does not apply.”).
48. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115, 119 (2001) (holding that 9 U.S.C.
§ 1 exempts only contracts of employment involving transportation wo rkers and not all contracts
of employment).
49. In J.I. Chase Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court determined that a collective bargaining
agreement could be considered a contract of employment only in “ rare cases.” 321 U.S. 332, 335
(1944). T he Court reasoned that “ no one has a job by reason of [a collective bargaining agreement]
and no obligation to any individual ordinarily comes into existence from it alone. ” Id.
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arbitration to the extent that it may provide guidance to courts reviewing
arbitration under the LMRA. 50 The LMRA provides for labor disputes to be
submitted “in any district court of the United States.” 51 The LMRA does not
provide various procedures to compel arbitration, nor does it provide specific
grounds for vacatur of arbitration decisions. 52 This is a significant difference
between the LMRA and the FAA. The FAA contains statutory grounds for
vacatur, including:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made. 53
Conspicuously, the FAA does not contain a ground for vacatur that is
specifically based on the merit of an arbitration award. 54 Since the LMRA does
not contain similar statutory grounds to guide judges in their review of
arbitration awards, case law developed to grant the courts jurisdiction to enforce
or vacate an arbitration award. 55 But early American courts looked upon

50. David L. Benetar, Arbitration of a Labor Dispute-Management Representation, 11 AM.
JR. T RIALS 327, § 1 (2018) (“ Although [the] Federal Arbitration Act is formally inapplicable to
labor arbitration, [the] Act is used as [a] source of principles to guide formulation of federal
common law of labor arbitration”).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (“ Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.”).
52. See id.
53. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)(4).
54. Stephen L. Hayford, The Federal Arbitration Act: Key to Stabilizing and Strengthening
the Law of Labor Arbitration, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP . & LAB. L. 521, 563 (2000) (“ The wording of,
and the narrow grounds for vacatur prescribed by, § 10(a) of the FAA do not contemplate any
judicial intrusion into the merits of challenged arbitration awards.”).
55. See Chi. T ypographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-T imes, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1503 (7th
Cir. 1991) (“ A suit to throw out a labor arbitrator’s award is . . . a suit to enforce the labor contract
that contained the clause authorizing the arbitration of disputes arising out of the contract. For in
arguing against the award, the plaintiff normally will be pointing to implicit or explicit limits that
the contract places on the arbitrator’s authority—principally that he was to interpret the contract
and not go off on a frolic of his own—and arguing that the arbitrator exceeded those limits.”).
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arbitration with disfavor, and the first significant shift was not until 1957 with
the case of Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills. 56
B.

Early Interactions of Arbitration and Judicial Review

The judicial position on the institution of labor arbitration has seen a radical
shift since the founding of the nation. 57 Prior to the American court system,
English common law viewed arbitration as an unwarranted usurpation of judicial
review. 58 This English common law sentiment was adopted by the early
American court system. 59 The early courts highly disfavored agreements that
“oust[ed] the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law.”60 The early courts saw
that every citizen had a “substantial right[]” to “resort to all the courts of the
country, and to invoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts may
afford him.”61
In fact, traditional courts were so hostile towards arbitration that either party
could “disavow the agreement [to arbitrate] prior to the actual arbitration,” 62
which became known as the “revocability doctrine.”63 The revocability doctrine
made it nearly impossible for a party to ask a court to compel arbitration. 64 The
early American courts saw this hostility towards arbitration too firmly rooted in
the common law for them to overturn. 65 Although the early courts did not favor
arbitration, and even allowed parties to revoke their arbitration agreements, the
courts were not willing to second-guess the arbitrator’s decision once the parties
submitted their disputes. 66 Even though the general judicial opinion of
arbitration has seen a shift, the notion that judges should not second-guess an
arbitrator’s decision as to the merits of the claim has remained consistent.

56. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
57. See FAIRWEATHER, P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 1 (4th ed.
1999). State and federal courts initially viewed labor arbitration as a competing institution of
dispute resolution and judges were less likely to accommodate labor arbitration because, in their
view, there was strong public policy favoring the intervention of the courts. Id.
58. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (noting that there
was a “ longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . at English common law”).
59. Id. (“ [T he FAA’s] purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts. ”).
60. Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874).
61. Id.
62. David E. Feller, Taft and Hartley Vindicated: The Curious History of Review of Labor
Arbitration Awards, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP . & LAB. L. 296, 301 (1998).
63. Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 9899 (2012).
64. Id. at 98.
65. Id. at 101 n.47 (quoting H.R. Rep No. 68–96, at 1 (1924)).
66. See Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Arbitral Injustice—Rethinking the Manifest Disregard
Standard for Judicial Review of Awards, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 283, 291 (2007); see also Brush
v. Fisher, 38 N.W. 446, 448 (1888) (“[I]t is evident that there are great objections to any general
interference by courts with awards.”).
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The American courts began to reject the view that arbitration should be
disfavored in 1957 with the Lincoln Mills case. 67 By 1960, in the Steelworker
Trilogy cases, the Supreme Court stated that labor arbitration should not be
subject to the same hostility as other types of arbitration. 68
C.

Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills

In the Lincoln Mills case, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, held that
federal law would govern suits under the LMRA. 69 This enabled federal courts
to interpret the LMRA, to compel arbitration if agreed to in a collective
bargaining agreement, and to create binding case law to establish grounds for
vacatur. This case initiated a shift to a preference for arbitration, rather than
judicial hostility towards it. 70 In fact, the Supreme Court made its position
favoring arbitration even more clear just a few years later in the Steelworker
Trilogy cases. 71
III. T HE ST EELWORKER T RILOGY CASES AND T HE CREAT ION OF T HE ESSENCE
T EST
A.

The Steelworker Trilogy Cases and the Favor of Arbitration in Labor
Disputes

The Steelworker Trilogy cases were a series of disputes arising from the
arbitration between the Steelworker’s Union and their employers. 72 These cases
formed the basis of the current jurisprudence regarding judicial review of labor
arbitration. Most notably, these cases demonstrate a shift away from court
hostility towards labor arbitration and towards courts favoring labor arbitration.
In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 73 a
group of steelworkers performed maintenance and repair work on a barge
located in Chickasaw, Alabama. 74 The owner of the barge terminated nineteen
steelworkers, instead hiring other companies to perform the bulk of its

67. Feller, supra note 62, at 300. David Feller briefed Lincoln Mills and argued the
Steelworker Trilogy cases and recalled that at the time of briefing Lincoln Mills arbitration was still
not favored. Id. at 299 n.13, 300 n.23.
68. See infra Section III.A.
69. T extile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
70. Feller, supra note 62, at 301 (“ So, as of 1957 with Lincoln Mills and as of 1960 with the
Steelworkers Trilogy, arbitration was in a preferred, if not exalted, status.”).
71. Id.
72. T he Steelworker Trilogy cases were each decided on the same day, June 20, 1960. See
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
73. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
74. Id. at 575.
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maintenance work. 75 These newly contracted companies then hired some of the
recently terminated steelworkers to perform the maintenance work on the barge,
but at reduced wages. 76 The Steelworkers Union filed a grievance with the barge
employer, claiming that the company was “arbitrarily and unreasonably
contracting out work . . . that could and previously ha[d] been performed by
Company employees.”77 The Steelworkers Union and the employer had a
collective bargaining agreement providing for arbitration of this type of dispute
so, after the employer refused to arbitrate, the Steelworkers Union petitioned the
District Court of Alabama to compel arbitration. 78
After the District Court and Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the employer, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and, ultimately, compelled arbitration. 79 The
Court unequivocally stated that public policy favors arbitration. 80 In stating that
public policy favors arbitration, the Court made a point to recognize the previous
opposition of the courts towards arbitration. 81 The Court justified its view of
public policy by drawing a distinction between labor arbitration and other forms
of arbitration, stating, “Since arbitration of labor disputes has quite different
functions from arbitration under an ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility
evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial agreements has no place
here. For arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is
part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.” 82 The Court noted
that the collective bargaining agreement created a new “common law of a
particular industry.”83
In United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 84 the
Supreme Court continued to favor arbitration of labor disputes and expanded its
application. In Enterprise Wheel, a group of steelworkers left their job in protest
of one of their co-workers termination. 85 At the recommendation of a union

75. Id. Between 1956 and 1958, the barge owner terminated almost h alf of its workforce. Id.
T he steelworker bargaining unit was reduced from 42 men to 23 men. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 577.
79. Id. at 577–78, 585 (finding that pursuant to section 301 of the LMRA, and pursuant to
Lincoln Mills, a court may enforce an arbitration provision contained in a collective bargaining
agreement).
80. Id. at 578 (“ T he present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through the
collective bargaining agreement. A major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a
provision for arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement. ”).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. “ One cannot reduce all the rules governing a community like an industrial plant to
fifteen or even fifty pages. Within the sphere of collective bargaining, the institutional
characteristics and the governmental nature of the collective-bargaining process demand a common
law of the shop which implements and furnishes the context of the agreement. ” Id. at 579–80.
84. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
85. Id. at 595.
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representative, the steelworkers asked for permission to return to work. 86 An
official of the employer initially agreed, but later rescinded the offer. 87 The
dispute went to arbitration, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, and
the arbitrator found that the steelworkers should be reinstated. 88 The employer
refused to comply with the decision of the arbitrator, and the Steelworkers Union
petitioned the court to enforce the decision. 89 The District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia ordered the employer to comply with the arbitration
award, but on appeal the Fourth Circuit vacated the award. 90
The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Court of Appeals, but agreed that
the District Court judgement “should be modified so that the amounts due the
employees may be definitely determined by arbitration.”91 In addition, the Court
reiterated its holding that a court may not review the merits of an arbitration
award. 92 While the Steelworker Trilogy cases evinced a shift towards favoring
arbitration, it was clear that the longstanding judicial policy to refrain from
second-guessing arbitrators would remain fundamental. The Court reasoned
“[t]he federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be
undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards.” 93 The Court
also emphasized the importance of the arbitrator’s judgment when it comes to
issuing a remedy, and indicated that the courts should defer to the arbitrator’s
judgment because he is a professional with working knowledge of the industry.94
In the last of the Steelworker Trilogy cases, United Steelworkers of America
v. American Manufacturing Co., 95 the Court was asked, once again, to compel
arbitration. 96 A steelworker in that case left his job due to an injury. 97 Some
weeks later, the Steelworkers Union filed a grievance claiming that the

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 595. T he arbitrator found that discharge was not justified, and that, in view of the
facts, a 10-day suspension was more appropriate. T he arbitrator ordered reinstatement of the
employees, plus back pay, but minus pay equal to a 10-day suspension. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 595–96. T he Fourth Circuit vacated parts of the arbitration award because, between
the termination of the employees and the conclusion of arbitration, the collective bargaining
agreement expired. T he Fourth Circuit reasoned, among other things, that reinstatement of the
steelworkers was not unenforceable because the collective bargaining agreement expired. Enter.
Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 269 F.2d 327, 331 –32 (4th Cir. 1959), cert.
granted, Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596. T his argument was used at arbitration as well,
but the arbitrator rejected the argument. Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 595.
91. Id. at 599.
92. Id. at 596 (“ T he refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper
approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.”).
93. Id.
94. See id. at 596–98.
95. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
96. Id. at 564.
97. Id. at 566.
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steelworker was entitled to return to work. 98 Once the employer refused to
arbitrate the dispute, the union asked the Court to compel arbitration. 99
Keeping in line with the previous Steelworker cases, the Court again affirmed
the policy favoring arbitration and enumerated more standards that would
confine the courts’ abilities to review the merits of the arbitration award. 100 The
Court stated, “[w]hether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of
contract interpretation for the arbitrator,” and that the “function of the court is
very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract
interpretation to the arbitrator.”101
The Steelworker Trilogy cases exemplified the Supreme Court’s position on
judicial review of arbitration in these areas. First, the Court noted its public
policy interests, finding that it weighed heavily in favor of the arbitration of labor
disputes agreed to in collective bargaining agreements. Second, the Court stated
the limits that reviewing courts were bound by when arbitration was freely
bargained for in a collective bargaining agreement. Third, the Court
underscored its prior holding that no vacatur of arbitration awards based on the
merits of the award would remain good law. Thus, while the Steelworker
Trilogy cases greatly restricted judicial review of arbitration awards, the Court
left open some narrow avenues to allow a court to vacate an arbitration award.
B.

Arbitration Awards Must Draw Their “Essence from the Contract”

In Enterprise Wheel, the Court made clear its intention of favoring
arbitration. 102 The Court emphasized the need for the arbitrator to have
flexibility in determining the arbitration award. 103 The Court reasoned that
flexibility was important because, “[t]he draftsmen may never have thought of
what specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular contingency.”104
But, at the same time, the Court recognized the necessity of some safeguards, to
ensure that an arbitrator “does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial
justice.”105
To prevent arbitrators from going rogue, the Enterprise Wheel Court stated
that an arbitration award may be vacated if it fails to “draw[] its essence from
the collective bargaining agreement.”106 Thus, if such an award does not draw
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, then the award cannot
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 569.
101. Id. at 567–68. The Court stated that in circumstances of a collective bargaining agreement
which required arbitration of an issue, the parties were bound by the arbitrator ’s judgment because
that was what was bargained for. See id. at 568.
102. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
103. Id. at 597.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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stand. 107 This judicial formulation became known as the “essence test” and
continues to be used as one of the primary mechanisms for courts to review
arbitration awards under the LMRA. 108
Twenty-seven years after the essence test was first promulgated in the
Steelworker Trilogy cases, the Supreme Court addressed the essence test again
in United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc.. 109 The
Court reaffirmed the basic formulation of the essence test—an arbitration award
may be vacated if it does not draw its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement and if the arbitrator is dispensing his “own brand of industrial
justice”—but said little else to clarify the essence test. 110 While the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the essence test, it also reaffirmed its policy of favoring
arbitration and prohibiting courts to review the merits of an award. 111
These two positions, refusing to review the merits of an arbitration award,
while also providing the ability to vacate an award that fails to draw its essence
from the agreement, are seemingly contrary. 112 This appears to be a paradox,
because how can a court determine that an award does not draw its essence from
the agreement without reviewing the merits of that award? This problem is
evident by the divided interpretations of the circuit courts on how to apply the
essence test. 113
C.

How Other Circuits Have Interpreted the Essence Test

Some circuit and lower courts have interpreted the essence test differently,
resulting in varying interpretations. 114 For example, in the First Circuit, an
arbitration award fails to draw its essence from the contract when it is
“unfounded in reason and fact.”115 The Ninth Circuit created a variation of the
107. Id. (“ [A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of indust rial justice. He may of
course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator ’s words manifest an
infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.”).
108. Waldron, supra note 6, at 553–54.
109. United Paperworks Int ’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc, 484 U.S 29, 36 (1987).
110. Id. (“ As long as the arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement, and is not merely his own brand of industrial justice, the award is legitimate. ” (internal
quotations omitted)).
111. Id. (“ T he courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the
parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract. ”).
112. Waldron, supra note 6, at 539 (arguing that “ many circuit courts have subtly refused to
restrain their desire to vacate labor arbitrator’s awards with which they disagree by developing tests
that water down the Supreme Court ’s ‘drawn from the essence’ precedent.”).
113. See infra Section III.C.
114. Bret F. Randall, The History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards
of Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 759, 762 (noting that “ lower courts have
developed numerous variations of the essence of the contract standard”).
115. Cytyc Corp. v. Deka Prods. Ltd. P ’ship, 439 F.3d 27, 334 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Hoteles
Condado Beach, La Concha and Convention Ctr. v. Union De T ronquistas Local 901, 763 F.2d 34,
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essence test to allow vacatur of an award if it is “completely irrational.”116 The
Third Circuit finds that an award draws its essence from the agreement when the
award “can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in light
of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties’ intention.” 117
The Sixth Circuit finds that an award draws its essence from the agreement when
the arbitrator is plausibly or arguably construing the contract. 118 The Eleventh
and Fifth Circuits find that an arbitration award fails to draw its essence from
the agreement when the award is “arbitrary and capricious” and has no basis in
the “letter or purpose” of the collective bargaining agreement. 119 The Eighth
Circuit, in Bureau of Engraving Inc. v. Graphic Communications International
Union, Local 1B, 120 interpreted the essence test to include “not only . . . express
provisions, but also . . . the industrial common law.”121 The Eighth Circuit noted
that the common law of the shop included “past practices of the industry . . . as
well as the parties’ negotiating history and other extrinsic evidence of their
intent.”122 The Eighth Circuit then went on to say that an award must stand when
an arbitrator is “arguably construing or applying the [Collective Bargaining
Agreement].”123
38 (1st Cir. 1985) (“ T his court may engage in a substantive review of the award only to determine
whether the award is unfounded in reason and fact . . . . In such cases, the award fails to draw its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement and must be overturned.” (internal quotations and
citations omitted)).
116. Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009) ( “ An award may be vacated if it
is completely irrational. T his standard is extremely narrow and is satisfied only where [the
arbitration decision] fails to draw its essence from the agreement.” (brackets in original) (internal
quotations and citations omitted)); see also Holly Sugar Corp. v. Distillery, Rectifying, Wine &
Allied Workers Int ’l. Union, 412 F.2d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 1969) (finding that an arbitration award
draws its essence from the agreement when “ the award represents a plausible interpretation of the
contract”).
117. Major League Umpires Ass’n v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 280
(3d Cir. 2004).
118. Memphis Dist. of Browning-Ferris Indus. of T enn., Inc. v. T eamsters Local Union No.
984, No. 90-5933, 1991 WL 203110 *1, *3–*4 (6th Cir. 1991).
119. Loveless v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Ainsworth
v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992) (“ [A]n award that is arbitrary or capricious is not
required to be enforced.”); Safeway Stores v. Am. Bakery and Confectionery Workers Int’l. Union,
Local 111, 390 F.2d 79, 81 (5th Cir. 1968) (“[I]f the award is arbitrary, capricious or not adequately
grounded in the basic collective bargaining contract, it will not be enforced by the courts. T his was
a reflection of similar [Steelworker] trilogy comments.”).
120. 164 F.3d 427 (8th Cir. 1999).
121. Id. In this case, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the arbitration award failed to draw its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement based off the industrial common law and the
parties’ intent. T he court noted that the evidence showed that the parties discussed a monetary
remedy for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, but intentionally chose not to include it.
Because the parties intentionally chose not to include the monetary provision in the collective
bargaining agreement, the award of monetary damages could not have drawn its essence from the
agreement. Id. at 429–30.
122. Id. at 429.
123. Id.
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Even though the Supreme Court has announced numerous times that
arbitration awards should not be reviewed on their merits, 124 the Eighth Circuit,
and other circuits, have used the essence test to do just that. 125 One scholar has
summarized the circuit courts’ use of the essence test as, “[i]nstead of declining
to weigh the merits, the Circuit Courts of Appeals are fashioning standards
whereby a challenged award is deemed to draw its essence from the contract
only when the reviewing court determines that it is based on an acceptably
correct interpretation of the contract.”126
This is possibly, at least in part, because the essence test is confusing, and
seemingly incompatible with the Court’s wishes that lower circuits refrain from
reviewing merits of arbitration decisions. The Supreme Court has overturned
circuit court decisions for misapplying the standard, 127 but, despite the
conflicting interpretations of the essence test, has yet to provide further guidance
on the proper application of the test.
David E. Feller, who briefed Lincoln Mills and argued the Steelworker Trilogy
cases, highlighted the confusion surrounding the essence test in a lecture on his
experience with arbitration litigation. 128 Feller called the Supreme Court’s
essence test an “unfortunate choice of words,” because “[o]ne man’s essence
may be another man’s (or a court’s) nonsense!”129 Similarly, other scholars have
criticized the circuit courts’ interpretations of the essence standard as frequently
being too broad. 130 The broadness of the essence test is adequately demonstrated
by examining the “arguably” interpretation that is used by multiple circuits. 131
Because “arguably” is so broad, almost all arbitration awards can be said to have
a basis in the agreement even when they are not relying on a specific provision
of the agreement. 132 In discussing an interpretation of the “arguably” standard
applied to the essence test, one Sixth Circuit judge stated: “[T]he Court appears
to say this: whenever it can be said by a court sitting in review that the arbitrator

124. See, e.g., MLB Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001); United Paperworks
Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc, 484 U.S 29, 36 (1987); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter.
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
125. See Waldron, supra note 6, at 539, 546–49 (illustrating the different standards the circuits
developed which suggests reaching the merits of arbitration.); see also T imothy J Heinsz, Judicial
Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Enterprise Wheel Goes Around and Around , 52 MO . L.
REV. 243, 24849 (1987) (discussing the paradox that the essence test presents by requiring judges
to consider a “ myriad of factual circumstances” in order to determine when an award does not
drawn its essence from the agreement).
126. Hayford, supra note 54, at 562.
127. See Waldron, supra note 6, at 553.
128. See Feller, supra note 62, at 299–302.
129. Id. at 302.
130. Randall, supra note 114, at 764.
131. Id. at 764–65 (discussing Memphis Dist. of Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. T eamsters
Local Union No. 984, No. 90-5933, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24760, at *11 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 1991)).
132. Randall, supra note 114, at 764; see also Memphis Dist. of Browning-Ferris Indus. of
Tenn., Inc., 1991 WL 203110 at *13–14.
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is directly (construing) or indirectly (applying) the CBA, then that court may not
set aside an arbitrator’s decision even if the decision is manifestly erroneous.”
This reading cannot be correct, however, as no arbitrator will ever issue a
decision so removed from the CBA that it cannot be argued afterwards by either
counsel or a judge that the contract played a part in the arbitrator’s decision. The
very fact of litigation means that someone is making that argument. 133
Clearly there is difficulty in interpreting the essence test too broadly. And
because the Supreme Court did not foreclose all judicial review of arbitration, it
cannot be said that such an interpretation of the essence test is valid. The issue
therefore becomes how a court can determine that an arbitration award does not
draw its essence from the agreement, without reaching the merits of the award.
Is such a test even possible? If the essence test is in fact incompatible with the
policy of refraining from review of the merits of an award, what should a
reviewing court do? Here are some suggestions about what can be done.
IV. CLARIFYING T HE ESSENCE T EST T HROUGH
AGREEMENT
A.

T HE COLLECT IVE

BARGAINING

Bargaining for an Expanded Scope of Judicial Review

One solution to the problem of the incompatibility of these two concepts is to
create a limited exception for courts to review the merits of those arbitration
awards. A contractual provision in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement
to allow for expanded judicial review when, for instance, “the arbitrator
committed errors of law or of fact,” could be effective. 134
Indeed, many arbitration agreements contained such provisions, but the circuit
courts were split as to their validity. 135 The Supreme Court addressed the split
in the circuits and ultimately rejected such an attempt to circumnavigate the
express grounds for vacatur within the context of the FAA. 136 However, labor
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement is governed by the LMRA
and not the FAA. 137 The LMRA leaves open the question of whether
contractually agreed to expanded judicial review of arbitration would be
permissible in the labor context.
133. Memphis Dist. of Browning-Ferris Indus. of Tenn., Inc., 1991 WL 203110 at *13.
134. Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241, 253–54 (1999).
135. Compare Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001);
Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96–2261, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248, at *1 (4th Cir. 1997);
Gateway T echs., Inc. v. MCI T elecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995) with Kyocera
Corp. v. Prudential-Bache T rade Servs. Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003); Bowen v. Amoco
Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 938 (10th Cir. 2001).
136. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (finding that parties may
not contractually broaden the scope of judicial vacatur for arbitration awards because the grounds
for vacatur in the Federal Arbitration Act are exclusive).
137. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Altering Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards, 2006
MICH . ST. L. REV. 235, 256–57.

754

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:737

One scholar has suggested that the answer to this is yes. 138 Unlike the FAA,
which provides for specific grounds for vacatur, 139 the LMRA has no such
provision. 140 Because the LMRA has no specific grounds for vacatur, the
Supreme Court would not have the same concern of parties circumnavigating
the express grounds for vacatur as it does in the FAA context. Additionally, a
labor collective bargaining agreement is an ongoing negotiation, where the
parties may correct any errors along the way, thus further supporting the
proposition that collective bargaining agreements can be contractually altered to
increase the level of judicial review. 141
The problem with this thesis, however, lies in the dicta of a Seventh Circuit
decision, 142 where the court stated “[i]f the parties want, they can contract for an
appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator’s award. But they cannot
contract for judicial review of that award; federal jurisdiction cannot be created
by contract.”143 While this statement is only dicta and not binding, it casts doubt
on the proposition that courts would be open to such a system.
Another substantial obstacle to an approach like this is that it undermines the
longstanding judicial policy to refrain from reviewing the merits of awards. The
policy to refrain from second-guessing arbitrators has been deeply rooted in the
American court system since its founding. 144 Even as the court system
experienced a tremendous shift towards favoring arbitration beginning with
Lincoln Mills and the Steelworker Trilogy cases, 145 the policy to refrain from
reviewing the merits of an award remained consistent. By allowing parties to
contractually alter the level of judicial review of arbitration awards, and even
agree to allow judges to review the merits of awards, the Court would be going
against jurisprudence that it has firmly held for over a century, and would permit
private parties to circumnavigate the public policy that prohibits judicial review
of the merits of arbitration awards.

138. Id. at 264.
139. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)(4).
140. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
141. Rubinstein, supra note 137, at 265. “ Additionally, because the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement are engaged in a continuing relationship and are free to correct any perceived
errors or mistakes that an arbitrator may make by negotiating a new collective bargaining
agreement, it is logical to permit parties to alter judicial review of a labor arbitration award under
Section 301.” Id.
142. Chi. T ypographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-T imes, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
143. Id. at 1505 (emphasis in original).
144. See supra note 66.
145. See generally United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
596 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582–83
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 –68 (1960); T extile
Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
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Why Collective Bargaining Would Cure the Essence Test Fumble

Even with doubt looming over the validity of contractual alterations of judicial
review, such a method would be in the interest of clarity and efficiency and is
therefore a legitimate approach. A contractually-agreed-to expanded scope of
judicial review would allow a reviewing court to examine the merits of an
arbitration award by looking for errors of law or fact, and ultimately determine
that an award fails to draw its essence from the agreement if there is such an
error of law or fact. Such a judicial vacatur would appear to be consistent with
the Supreme Court’s policy favoring the intention of the parties in negotiating
their arbitration provisions because the contract would demonstrate the intention
of the parties to have a court review findings of law and fact. 146 This mechanism
would allow reviewing courts to apply the essence test and eliminate the paradox
created by the essence test and conflicting mandate to refrain from reviewing the
merits of the arbitration awards. 147
The usefulness of this solution can be seen in a hypothetical using the facts
from the Peterson case. 148 If the NFL collective bargaining agreement contained
a provision that allowed for a reviewing judge to review arbitration awards for
“errors of law or of fact,”149 then it is very unlikely that the Eighth Circuit would
have overturned the District Court. The District Court held that the arbitrator’s
award ignored the “law of the shop” and failed to draw its essence from the
agreement because it retroactively applied a new personal conduct policy to
Peterson. 150 Retired Federal Judge Barbara Jones held in the Rice arbitration
that the NFL could not retroactively apply the policy to a player. 151 The District
Court found that the arbitrator committed an error of fact by distinguishing the
Rice case from the Peterson case, finding “no valid basis to distinguish this case
from the Rice matter.”152 Accordingly, the District Court went on to overturn
the arbitration award relying, in part, on this factual finding that Rice and
Peterson were indistinguishable. 153

146. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567–68 (“ The function of the court is very limited when the
parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. . . . Whether
the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator.”
(emphasis added)).
147. See generally Major League Umpires Ass’n v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 357
F.3d 272, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2004).
148. See NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (D. Minn. 2015),
rev’d and remanded NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2016).
149. Younger, supra note 134, at 254.
150. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 109091.
151. Barbara S. Jones, In the Matter of Ray Rice, ESPN (Nov. 28, 2014),
http://www.espn.com/pdf/2014/1128/141128_rice-summary.pdf. (“ Recognizing that even under
the broad deference afforded to [the Commissioner] through Article 46 [of the collective bar gaining
agreement], he could not retroactively apply the new presumptive penalty to Rice . . . . “ ).
152. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1091.
153. Id.
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On appeal, it is very likely that the Eighth Circuit would have upheld the
District Court’s decision on the grounds that the collective bargaining agreement
allowed for judicial review of factual errors, and on the grounds that circuit
courts frequently defer to lower courts on matters of factual findings. 154 In this
type of scenario, the ability to contractually expand the scope of judicial review
of arbitration could have been extremely beneficial for Peterson and other
similarly situated parties.
Circuit and lower courts are already reviewing the merits of arbitration
awards, despite the Supreme Court’s express prohibition. 155 Some courts have
utilized the essence test, applying various interpretations and meanings, to
overturn arbitration awards based on the underlying merits of the case. 156 The
inability of lower courts to resist reviewing the merits of an arbitration award is
perhaps attributable to the fact that courts, on a daily basis, review the merits of
claims. This is their function as judges. For a judge to suppress his basic instinct
merely because this type of cases happens to come from arbitration can be
difficult. In fact, such a scenario was seen in the Peterson case. 157
In the Peterson case, the District Court effectively reviewed the merits of the
arbitration award under the guise of the essence test. 158 The District Court found
that the Peterson case was not distinguishable from Rice, 159 and that by ignoring
the law of the shop the arbitration award did not draw its essence from the
agreement. 160 The Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected this argument and
conclusion. 161 The Eighth Circuit gave credit to the arbitrator’s finding that the
new personal conduct policy was not a change of the previous policy, but more
of a clarification of discipline, and therefore was not a retroactive application to

154. See, e.g., T eitelbaum v. Lay Siok Lin, 423 Fed. App’x 106, 106 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e
defer to factual findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous. ”); Xiong Dong v.
Attorney General of U.S., 257 F. App’x 513, 515 (3d Cir. 2007) (“ We also defer to factual
findings.”); Cruz v. Miller, No. 92-3141, 1993 WL 83427, at *4 (7th Cir. Mar. 23, 1993) (“[W]e
defer to factual findings of state courts.”).
155. See Nicholas J. Zidik, Sitting as “Superarbitrators” or According “Great Deference?”
Pennsylvania Courts and the Essence Test Under PERA Since State System of Higher Education
(Cheyney University) v. State College and University Professional Association (PSEA-NEA), 41
DUQ . L. REV. 579, 582 (2003) (discussing the different iterations of the essence test and its use by
the courts to overturn decisions it does not agree with).
156. See State Sys. of Higher Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State Coll. Univ. Prof ’l Ass’n (PSEANEA), 743 A.2d 405, 413 (Pa. 1999) (discussing the use of less deferential standards of the essence
test and its ability to empower courts to become “ superarbitrator[s]” to “vacate an award when it
finds that the award is at odds with how the members of the court would have decided the case. ”).
157. See NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1091 (D. Minn.
2015), rev’d and remanded NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir.
2016).
158. See NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1091.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson, 831 F.3d at 994.
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Peterson. 162 The Eighth Circuit reminded the District Court that judicial review
is forbidden from reaching the merits of an award, even if based on factual
errors. 163 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit went on to say that, “[a]n erroneous
interpretation of a contract, including the law of the shop, is not a sufficient basis
for disregarding the conclusion of the [arbitrator].”164
The Peterson case is just one example of lower courts using the essence test
to review the merits of arbitration awards, and to overturn those awards. In this
sense, the essence test seems unworkable. In fact, one scholar suggests that even
if the Supreme Court were to add more language to clarify the essence test, it
would be of little help. 165 He suggested that judges have an innate instinct to act
like judges, namely, to review facts for errors and to apply the correct legal
standards. 166 And, that it may even be “foolhardy” to believe that judges can
resist the temptation to overturn awards in light of clear errors of law or fact. 167
It therefore makes even more sense to allow parties to contractually alter judicial
standards of review.
By allowing parties to contractually agree to alter standards of judicial review,
the Supreme Court could perhaps add guiding principles to the essence test that
the lower courts may actually follow. If an arbitrator’s decision rests on factual
or legal errors, and the collective bargaining agreement allows for judicial
review of factual and legal errors, then a judge could hold that the award failed
to draw its essence from the agreement because it rested on factual or legal
errors. This outcome would be in line with the parties’ intentions, and would
provide an opportunity to make the essence test and the prohibition on merit
review compatible.
V.

GET T ING CONGRESS INVOLVED: ADDING T O T HE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELAT IONS ACT

An alternative avenue to eliminate the continued use of the essence test as an
impermissible vehicle to review merits of arbitration awards would be for
Congress to create specific grounds for vacatur similar to those in the FAA. 168

162. Id. at 994–95 (“ T he arbitrator, having been presented with the Commissioner’s
statements, concluded that the August 2014 communications did not constitute a change of the
Personal Conduct Policy. He necessarily found, therefore, that Goodell’s statements were not
admissions to the contrary. Courts are not permitted to review the merits of an arbitration decision
even when a party claims that the decision rests on factual errors.”).
163. Id. at 995.
164. Id. at 994.
165. Lewis B. Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 274 (1980) (“ [I]t is apparent that this judicial instinct [to interpret and
apply standards codified in contracts, regulations, and statutes] will not be stifled by incantations
of finality, or by still more verbal formulations of the proper scope of review.”).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Benetar, supra note 50, at 81.
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Following the language of the specific grounds for vacatur in the FAA would
be a good starting point. In fact, some scholars have suggested that the grounds
listed in the FAA are essentially the same common law grounds for vacatur
already created for labor arbitration. 169 Indeed, there is a legitimate argument to
be made that FAA section 10(a)(4) is analogous to the Supreme Court’s essence
test, including the Supreme Court’s prohibition against merit review of
arbitration awards. 170
But arbitration under the FAA and labor arbitration under the LMRA are
inherently different. The purposes of arbitration under the FAA and LMRA are
“distinct processes, arising in mutually exclusive environments and serving
different purposes.”171 What works in the context of, for example, commercial
arbitration under the FAA, may not be sufficient in labor arbitration under the
LMRA.
As stated above, parties to a collective bargaining agreement are engaged in a
business negotiation. 172 Labor relations and collective bargaining agreements
entail ongoing negotiations that are mutually beneficial to all parties. The
relationship between employer and employee, and the terms of employment, are
unique to such an extent that it should be afforded a different set of standards
than those prescribed under the FAA. Accordingly, FAA section 10(a)(4) 173 is
a good starting point to begin to encompass the essence test, but it should be
broadened to allow for review of errors of law or fact as well, such as providing
the “vacatur of arbitration awards that fail to draw their essence from the
agreement” and that “awards fail to draw their essence from the agreement when
they are based on an erroneous interpretation of law or fact.”
VI. WHY A MODERN SUPREME COURT NEEDS T O REVISIT

T HE ESSENCE

T EST

This is a current issue for labor arbitration disputes that requires the Supreme
Court’s immediate attention. Labor arbitration is “the primary method utilized
by public and private employers and unions to solve disputes that arise in the
workplace under labor agreements.”174 The Court in the Steelworker Trilogy175
cases may not have anticipated the prevalence of labor arbitration in today’s
169. Hayford, supra note 54, at 563 (“ The substance of sub-sections (a)(1)–(3) [of the FAA
§10], sanctioning vacatur for serious acts of party, advocate, and arbitrator misconduct is already
reflected, to a limited extent, in the labor arbitration case law.”).
170. Id. at 565–66 (noting that § 10(a)(4) allows vacatur when an arbitrator “ exceeded their
powers,” but that even under this standard a reviewing court must defer to the arbitrator’s
interpretation of the law, the contract, and findings of fact).
171. Stephen L. Hayford & Scott B. Kerrigan, Vacatur: The Non-Statutory Grounds for
Judicial Review of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 51 DISP . RESOL . J. 22, 83 (1996).
172. See supra note 141.
173. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
174. A Practical Guide to Grievance Arbitration, supra note 1, at 1.
175. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigat ion Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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industries. A modern Supreme Court should review the policy considerations
of the Steelworker Trilogy Court against reviewing the merits of awards, and ask
themselves, considering the prevalence of labor arbitration, is it better public
policy to encourage the finality of arbitration, or to get the issue correct?
Moreover, labor arbitration under the LMRA is dependent on case law to
continue developing, especially in the context of vacaturs. 176 In order for there
to be a uniform application of the essence test, the Supreme Court must grant
certiorari to more labor arbitration cases. If the Supreme Court does not hear
more labor arbitration cases, the essence test will continue down a path of
confusion and frustration.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the Steelworker Trilogy cases, the essence test has become increasingly
unworkable. The Peterson case is just one recent example of the disagreement
between circuit and lower courts on the applicability of the essence test. It
demonstrated the seeming incompatibility with the Court’s mandate to refrain
from reviewing the merits of arbitration awards.
The Supreme Court can eliminate mass confusion and discrepancies among
the circuits as to the essence test’s application and meaning by allowing parties
to contractually agree to altered standards of judicial review to allow for vacaturs
based on things like factual or legal errors. While this approach is not without
its difficulties, this method would be in line with the parties’ intentions, and
allow the courts to avoid the confusing doctrine of the essence test. It would
represent sound public policy by allowing parties to freely bargain in labor
agreements, and increase the overall efficiency of judicial review of arbitration.
Additionally, this same result could be accomplished through legislation
amending the LMRA. Specific grounds for vacatur, similar to those in the FAA,
but including vacatur based on errors of law or fact, would eliminate the need
for the common-law essence test, while continuing to honor LMRA and FAA
arbitrations as distinct processes.

176.

T he LMRA does not have specific grounds for vacatur.
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